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Risky Business: Attorney Liability in Insurance
Defense Litigation—A Review of the Arizona
Supreme Court’s Decision in Paradigm
Insurance Co. v. Langerman Law Offices
I. INTRODUCTION
The unique nature of the tripartite relationship, created when an
insurer hires a lawyer to represent an insured, has created confusion
on the part of many insurance defense attorneys.1 In such
circumstances, it can be unclear how to ethically proceed with
insurance defense litigation in order to avoid the pitfalls of
malpractice liability. Although intended to simplify the ethical
dilemmas for lawyers, a tripartite relationship often creates a situation
in which the lawyer retained by the insurer to represent the insured
does not know who her client is—the insurer, the insured, or both.2
Often, the divergent interests of the insurer and the insured magnify
the attorney’s dilemma of loyalty.
In the absence of concrete and consistent common law decisions
regulating the procedural aspects of insurance defense, some courts
have recently begun to rely heavily upon the newly enacted
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (“Restatement”)
to determine the ethical boundaries of lawyer conduct.3

1. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 262–63 (1995) (“Insurance defense lawyers are integral
parts of the engine that drives civil litigation, and the rules that govern their conduct are both
extraordinarily vague and often wrong.”).
2. See Allison M. Mizuo, Note, Finley v. Home Insurance Co.: Hawai’i’s Answer to the
Troubling Tripartite Problem, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 675, 675 (2000). Thomas D. Morgan, a
law professor at the George Washington University Law School, writes:
The question of whom the lawyer represents in such cases is not new. It was implicit
in articles written by Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton beginning more than
forty years ago. But it has been raised again with unusual intensity in response to
publication of a recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers.
Thomas D. Morgan, Whose Lawyer Are You Anyway?, 23 WM . MITCHELL L. REV. 11, 13
(1997).
3. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 600 (Ariz.
2001). Although it is still too early to know just how much of an impact the Restatement
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Unfortunately, inconsistencies among some jurisdictions have only
perpetuated the problems in this area of the law. One prominent
author has noted, “[t]he rules [surrounding insurance defense
litigation] fail to provide clear and defensible answers to the most
basic questions, such as whether an attorney-client relationship exists
between the insurance company and the lawyer retained to handle
the lawsuit against the insured.”4 Consequently, “the obvious danger
is that insurance defense lawyers will act improperly, even when they
attempt to adhere to the law.”5
Recently, some courts have unsuccessfully attempted to clarify
both the procedural standards governing insurance defense litigation
and the ethical boundaries of the attorney-client relationship.6
Paradigm Insurance Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, decided by the
Arizona Supreme Court in June of 2001, is such a case.7 Although
the Langerman court may have achieved an equitable result, it failed
to advance the proper analysis in reaching its result. If the
inconsistent procedural standards are not clarified, uncertainty and
ambiguity regarding the duties of insurance defense attorneys will
continue to result in inconsistent representation and possible injury
to the insurer, the insured, and especially the attorney. Insurance
defense lawyers will continue to flounder as to whom they actually
represent and where their duties of loyalty lie.
Part II of this Note reviews the facts and the reasoning of the
court surrounding the Langerman decision. Part III discusses the
history of the tripartite relationship between the insured, the insurer,
and the lawyer hired to represent the insured. In order to elucidate
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (“Restatement”) will have on the formation of law, some
scholars believe “its impact will be great.” Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability
Carriers Second-Class Clients? No, but They May Be Soon—A Call to Arms Against the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 21.
The American Law Institute, the sponsor of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, is an enormously influential organization. Its various Restatements, which
blend consensus with reform, have gained widespread adoption by state courts and have
sometimes changed the face of the American law. For example, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts greatly facilitated the spread of strict liability law and, hence, the growth of enterprise
liability theory. Id.
4. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 263.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Parichan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Pine Island Farmers’ Coop. v. Erstad & Riemer, P.A., 649 N.W.2d 444
(Minn. 2002).
7. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 594.
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the basic procedural standards that should govern this area of the
law, this Note will discuss the origin of the tripartite relationship
itself, the attorney-client privilege, the potential conflicts of interest
unique to the tripartite relationship, and the definition of a client.
Part IV reviews the scholarly thought with regard to attorney liability
in the insurance defense context, asserting that the retainer
agreement should define the scope of liability for the attorney.8 Part
V will apply the retainer agreement theory and will discuss the
application of this theory to Langerman. This Note ultimately
concludes that the retainer agreement should be the operative
document all parties in the tripartite relationship look to for
clarification regarding an insurance defense attorney’s duties to the
client. Such a standard is critical in minimizing attorney malpractice
liability for lawyers engaged in the risky business of the tripartite
relationship.
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS SURROUNDING LANGERMAN
The issue before the Arizona Supreme Court in Langerman was
“whether an attorney may be held liable to an insurer, which
assigned him to represent an insured, when the attorney’s negligence
damage[d] only the insurer.”9 The plaintiff, Paradigm Insurance
Company (“Paradigm”), had issued an insurance policy covering
medical malpractice liability to Dr. Benjamin A. Vanderwerf, Medical
Director of Samaritan Transplant Service.10 Renee Taylor, one of
Vanderwerf’s patients, brought a malpractice suit against him and
included Samaritan Health Services (“Samaritan”) as a defendant,
claiming that Vanderwerf was acting as an agent for Samaritan at the
time the alleged malpractice occurred.11 Under Vanderwerf’s liability
policy, Paradigm was responsible (1) for paying the doctor’s liability
to Taylor if such liability was found, and (2) for paying for the legal
defense of any liability claims against the doctor.12 At the time the
complaint was filed against Vanderwerf, Paradigm hired an attorney,
Langerman, to represent Vanderwerf; Vanderwerf consented to this
8. The thesis of this Note is based upon the theories of Professor Charles Silver, law
professor at the University of Texas School of Law.
9. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 594.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 11–12, for a review of the basic insurance coverage
included in a typical liability insurance policy similar to the policy in Langerman.
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representation.13 “During the course of representation, Langerman
advised Paradigm that it believed there was no viable theory of
liability against Samaritan. Langerman, however, failed to investigate
whether Vanderwerf was covered by Samaritan’s liability insurance
and, thus, was unable to advise Paradigm whether the defense could
be tendered to Samaritan.”14
When Paradigm later learned that Langerman had a conflict of
interest with Paradigm, Paradigm terminated Langerman as
Vanderwerf’s counsel and hired a new attorney.15 The new counsel
discovered that, in addition to being covered by Paradigm,
Vanderwerf was also covered by Samaritan Insurance Funding
(“SIF”) and that SIF was Vanderwerf’s primary coverage.16
However, when Vanderwerf’s new counsel attempted to tender the
claim to SIF, SIF rejected the claim “on the grounds that the tender
was untimely,” leaving Paradigm with the obligation to pay Dr.
Vanderwerf’s entire liability.17 Although Langerman’s negligence did
not injure Dr. Vanderwerf (the insured) it allegedly increased
Paradigm’s (the insurer) costs tremendously by forcing Paradigm to
take sole responsibility of the settlement without the opportunity of
turning to SIF for contribution or indemnification.18 Thus, when
Langerman requested payment for his services, Paradigm refused to
pay, citing Langerman’s negligence as justification. Langerman then
sued for collection of his fees, and Paradigm filed a counterclaim for
damages.19
The trial court, in granting summary judgment, “held that
because there was no express agreement that Langerman could
represent both Paradigm and Vanderwerf, no attorney-client
relationship existed between Langerman and Paradigm.”20 The trial

13. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 594.
14. Id. at 594–95.
15. See id. at 595.
16. See id. Recognizing the potential benefits of Dr. Vanderwerf’s dual coverage, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated, “At least hypothetically [being covered by both a primary and a
secondary carrier] would be of some benefit to Vanderwerf: if SIF was determined to be the
primary and Paradigm the excess carrier, Vanderwerf’s malpractice protection for Talyor’s [sic]
claim would be increased to the combined limits of the two policies.” Id.
17. Id. Taylor’s claim against Vanderwerf “was eventually settled for an amount within
Paradigm’s policy limits.” Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
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court accordingly found that “Langerman owed no duty of care to
Paradigm and could not be held liable for negligence that injured
only Paradigm but not Langerman’s sole client, Vanderwerf.”21 The
court of appeals reversed in part on the theory of an implied, rather
than express, attorney-client agreement, holding that where no “real
or apparent conflict between the insured and the insurer” existed,
insurance defense counsel actually represented both, thus creating a
duty of care on the part of the attorney not only to the insured but
also to the insurer.22 Because the trial court had granted summary
judgment in Langerman’s favor, the Arizona Supreme Court
assumed that Langerman was actually negligent in causing financial
harm to Paradigm.23
Although the court left some issues unresolved, like whether
Langerman’s failure to determine the primary provider actually
constituted an act of negligence, the Arizona Supreme Court
identified three main issues discussed in this Note: (1) whether an
express agreement is necessary to form an attorney-client
relationship, (2) whether potential and actual conflicts of interest
arise with the insurer as client, and (3) whether a duty to a nonclient exists. In its holding, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that
when the interest of the insurer and the insured coincide, the lawyer
has a duty to the insured and the insurer, and can therefore be liable
to the insurer even if the insurer is considered to be a non-client.24
The next three sections of this Note will articulate the reasoning of
the Langerman court concerning these three main issues. The
wisdom of the court’s analysis, however, will be challenged later in
this Note.
A. Formation of Attorney-Client Relationship
Through an Express Agreement
The Langerman court relied upon the Restatement and other
Arizona cases to hold that an express agreement was not required to
establish an attorney-client relationship.25 The plaintiff, Langerman,
argued to the contrary that no duty of care could be created between

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 594.
See id. at 602.
See id. at 596.

647

AND-FIN

9/30/2002 10:37 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2002

the lawyer and the insurer if an attorney-client relationship did not
exist; furthermore, Langerman argued, if the lawyer had no duty of
care to the insurer, he could not be liable for alleged negligent
conduct which injured the insurer but not the insured. In rebutting
Langerman’s arguments, the court cited Restatement section 14,
which states, “A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a
person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and . . . (a) the lawyer manifests
to the person consent to do so . . . .”26 Additionally, the Langerman
court defined an attorney-client relationship as being created when
“an ordinary person would look to the lawyer as a protector rather
than as an adversary.”27 Thus, an alleged client’s reasonable and
objective “belief that [the lawyer] was [his] attorney” is necessary to
establish an attorney-client relationship, in this case, between the
insurer and the lawyer.28
B. Potential and Actual Conflicts of Interest
Between Insurer and Insured
Perhaps one of the most debated issues surrounding the
insurance defense attorney liability question regards the analysis of
how and to what extent conflicts of interest between the insurer and
the insured affect procedural rules governing the lawyer’s
relationship to the client(s). Although the Langerman court refused
to determine whether both Paradigm and Vanderwerf were
Langerman’s clients,29 it did hold that “when an insurer assigns an
attorney to represent an insured, the lawyer has a duty to the insurer
arising from the understanding that the lawyer’s services are
ordinarily intended to benefit both insurer and insured when their
interests coincide.”30
However, the Langerman court repudiated the “view that the
lawyer automatically represents both insurer and insured until the
conflict [of interest] actually arises”31 by relying on Restatement

26.
27.
1988)).
28.
29.
30.
31.
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section 121 and the basic rule prohibiting conflicts: A conflict of
interest exists “if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s
representation of the client would be materially and adversely
affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to . . . a
third person.”32 Agreeing with Langerman, the court reasoned “that
actual conflicts between insured and insurer are quite common and
that the potential for conflict is present in every case.”33 However,
the court concluded that the interests of the insurer and the insured
do not inherently conflict but “frequently coincide.”34 For example,
both the insured and the insurer share an interest in “presenting a
strong defense to a claim that they believe to be unfounded as to
liability, damages, or both.”35 The Langerman court suggested that
in such cases, there is a high probability that “the potential for
conflict may never become substantial,”36 and will, consequently,
never satisfy the Restatement’s definition of a conflict of interest.
C. Duty to Non-Clients
Instead of classifying the insurance company as a second client,
which would have essentially required the court to delve into
uncharted legal terrain, the Langerman court held that even if the
insurer were not a client to the attorney, the attorney, depending on
the facts of the case, might still be liable to the insurer.37 The court
relied upon the Restatement section 51(3) to show that even if the
insurer were a non-client, an attorney may be liable to the insured in
some cases:
[A] lawyer owes a duty of care . . . to a nonclient when and to the
extent that:

32. Id. at 597 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 121 (1998)).
33. Id. The court made a short list, albeit not exhaustive, of the potential conflicts of
interest that may be present between the insurer and the insured. Id. Such conflicts included
the scope of the coverage, how the case is to be defended, how information is shared, and the
desirability of settlement. Id. See infra Part III.B for a more in depth discussion of these and
other potential conflicts that are relevant to the debate regarding whether an attorney should
be liable to the insurer.
34. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 598.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 600.
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(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary
objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services
benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer’s
performance of obligations to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of
those obligations to the client unlikely.38

Furthermore, the court explained that a lawyer owes a duty to
the insurer when the interests of the insurer and the insured are not
in conflict, “whether or not the insurer is held to be a co-client of
the lawyer.”39 Ultimately, the following statement proved compelling
for the Langerman court: “Because and to the extent that the
insurer is directly concerned in the matter financially, the insurer
should be accorded standing to assert a claim for appropriate relief
from the lawyer for financial loss proximately caused by professional
negligence or other wrongful act[s] of the lawyer.”40
III. HISTORY OF INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL LIABILITY
AND THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP
Understanding the origin of the tripartite relationship is crucial
to analyzing Langerman. In the context of insurance defense
litigation,41 “most insurance policies accord to the insurer the duty
to defend the insured and the right to control the insured’s defense.
When the insurer appoints counsel to defend an insured, the triad of
insurer, defense counsel and insured”42 is what is known as the
tripartite relationship. This relationship has been further explained as
“a loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common
goal, sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency of
38. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(3)
(1998)).
39. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51
cmt. g).
40. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134
cmt. g).
41. “The vast majority of liability insurance policies cover both risks, obligating the
insurance company to defend lawsuits against the insured, to pay the costs of defense, and to
indemnify the insured for judgments and settlements up to a specified limit.” Silver & Syverud,
supra note 1, at 264.
42. Eileen M. Dacey, The Delicate Balance of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Tripartite Relationship, 602 PLI/LIT 199, 203 (1999).
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the claim or litigation against the insured.”43 The debate regarding
this controversial relationship between the insurer, the attorney hired
by the insurer, and the insured is not new. In the 1940s through the
1960s Professor (now Judge) Robert E. Keeton brought the issues
surrounding the tripartite relationship to the forefront of scholarly
attention;44 however, during the 1970s and 1980s the “subject
dropped off the radar screen insofar as most academics were
concerned.”45 In recent years, however, the pronouncement of the
Restatement (Third) of the Laws Governing Lawyers, the political
attention directed toward the insurance industry, and the drastic
increase in insurance malpractice suits have all contributed to a
resurgence of the tripartite debate.46
Current attempts to explain the unique ethical issues of the
tripartite relationship have, for the most part, proven fruitless.47 One
author described the tripartite relationship as “ethically sanctioned
‘duality of representation.’”48 Another author noted that the
Restatement’s analysis of the relationship was “conceptually
impoverished,”49 while the American Bar Association recognized that
“[t]he Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer virtually no
guidance as to whether the lawyer retained and paid by an insurer to
defend its insured represents the insured, insurer, or both.”50 Such
issues are at the heart of the tripartite relationship itself. Another
author, after trying to define the ethical duties and boundaries of
insurance defense lawyers, explained:

43. Robert B. Gilbreath, Caught in a Crossfire Preventing and Handling Conflicts of
Interest: Guidelines for Texas Insurance Defense Counsel, 27 TEX . TECH L. REV. 139, 144–45
(1996) (quoting Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 571 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974)).
44. Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the
Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205,
206 (1997–98).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. One author has referred to the complex issues of the tripartite relationship as an
“ethical minefield.” Dacey, supra note 42, at 203.
48. Gilbreath, supra note 43, at 142 (quoting Michael J. Brady & Heather A. McKee,
Ethics in Insurance Defense Context: Isn’t Cumis Counsel Unnecessary?, 58 DEF. COUNS. J. 230,
230 (1991)).
49. Silver & Quinn, supra note 3, at 21, 39; see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 15.
50. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 45 (2001)
(quoting ABA, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS O PINIONS 1983–1998, at 403 (2000))
(discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers who are hired by insurance companies).
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If this rudimentary compass seems inadequate, that is because it is.
The eternal triangle has vexed insurance defense practitioners for
years and navigation is getting no easier. Emerging conflict of
interest issues pose new problems, and even a minor error in
direction or judgment can throw defense counsel hopelessly off
course.51

The difficulty in wading through the tripartite quagmire
originates from the ethical dilemmas regarding representation posed
to insurance defense attorneys. Such dilemmas include, but are not
limited to, issues of loyalty to the client and conflicts of interest
between the insurer and the insured. The following hypothetical
illustrates a typical conflict of interest in the tripartite: Dr. Jones is
sued for malpractice by her patient. Concerned about her medical
reputation, Dr. Jones desires that the case go through trial so that
she can be vindicated of any wrongdoing. She does not want to
settle the claim because she fears that doing so may subject her to
review before the licensing board. Furthermore, she knows her
premiums will skyrocket if she settles. The insurance company, on
the other hand, prefers to settle the claim for as little as possible
rather than go through trial. It knows that any court decision could
have long-lasting effects not only on its business but also on the
entire industry, and it fears having to pay the potentially enormous
damages award if it loses at trial. Conflicts of interest such as this
exist in almost every liability insurance tripartite relationship.
Due to a deficit of judicial and legislative direction regarding the
procedural requirements of loyalty to one’s client and the
ambiguities surrounding the question of just who the client is in the
tripartite context, insurance defense attorneys are currently left
unguided and unprotected from malpractice liability.52 Indeed, in the
51. Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 536 (1995).
52. Professors Silver and Syverud have summarized the issues as follows:
Insurance defense lawyers are integral parts of the engine that drives civil litigation,
and the rules that govern their conduct are both extraordinarily vague and often
wrong. The rules fail to provide clear and defensible answers to the most basic
questions, such as whether an attorney-client relationship exists between the
insurance company and the lawyer retained to handle the lawsuit against the insured.
Consequently, the rules are almost entirely unhelpful when more complicated
questions arise. The obvious danger is that insurance defense lawyers will act
improperly, even when they attempt to adhere to the law. The less obvious danger is
that the procedural system, broadly understood as encompassing all the rules and
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context of the Langerman decision, it is especially important to
consider both the lawyer’s responsibility to the insurer53 and the
procedural standards that should be established to protect the lawyer
from unknowingly violating a duty of ethical conduct. The tripartite
relationship “requires a delicate balance of rights and duties.”54 A
good starting point for examining these rights and duties is the
attorney-client relationship.
A. The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Establishment of Liability
Typically, only a client or an entity in privity of contract with the
lawyer is authorized to sue the lawyer for malpractice (or
negligence).55 Although privity was, historically, a fixed requirement
for claims of negligence, many jurisdictions, including New York,
continue to adhere to this privity rule.56 However, in the context of
the tripartite relationship, general privity analysis has, for the most
part, been augmented by the rules of professional responsibility and
the question of whether an attorney-client relationship has been
formed between the insurance defense attorney and the insurer.57
forces that influence the progress of litigation, will work less well than it should,
driving up insurance costs and distorting insurance contracts.
Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 262–63.
53. See Michael Sean Quinn, Whom Does the Insurance Defense Lawyer Represent?, SE64
ALI–ABA 171, 191 (2000).
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 45 (2001).
55. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 84–85
(2d ed. 1994).
56. See id. at 85. States have adopted other theories that reject the privity requirement:
Jurisdictions that, rejecting privity, hold that a lawyer may owe a duty of care to
non-clients take a number of approaches. Some . . . apply a balancing-of-factors
approach giving substantial weight to whether the situation is one in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that a lawyer’s absence of due care will directly harm a third
person . . . . Other jurisdictions . . . limit the duty of care for negligent lawyer
conduct to situations in which the lawyer’s services are intended to influence or
benefit specific third persons.
Id. at 85–86. The Langerman decision seems to fall into this third category when it quotes the
Restatement. See Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 600 (Ariz.
2001). For further elaboration on the negligence/malpractice theories used by various
jurisdictions, see generally Richmond, supra note 51, at 484–85.
57. Most scholars agree that, in the context of the tripartite relationship, the question of
whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed between the insurance defense
attorney and the insured is clear: “The relationship between defense counsel and the insured is
simply that of attorney and client, and the relationship imposes on defense counsel the same
duty of unqualified loyalty as if personally retained by the insured.” Gilbreath, supra note 43,
at 145.
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The preeminent question in determining the extent of an insurance
defense lawyer’s responsibilities and liabilities within the tripartite
relationship is whether the lawyer has an operative attorney-client
relationship with the insured, the insurer, or both. Who the lawyer
represents has significant ethical ramifications. In fact, much of the
tripartite debate centers on the number of clients an insurance
defense attorney represents: “one (the insured) or two (the company
and the insured).”58 This section will briefly discuss the rules of
professional responsibility, including the rules governing the
attorney-client privilege, which may clarify the ethical conflict of
interest issues present in the tripartite relationship.59
The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”)
offers little direction concerning the conduct of a lawyer who
represents two clients. Simply stated, “A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client,” unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the
representation will not be adversely affected and that each client
consents to such representation.60 Further, a lawyer may not
represent a client if such representation is “materially limited” when
the lawyer represents an additional party.61 In the insurance defense
context, this instruction from the Model Rules allows the practitioner
great discretion in determining whether the insured’s interest will be
adversely affected. To avoid losing clientele, practitioners will most
likely err on the side of the insurer, finding no material limitations in
the representation. Such discretion combined with the inherent
conflicts of interest leave the practitioner vulnerable to malpractice
liability.
The Model Rules stress the importance of loyalty to one’s client.
Such loyalty has arguably been a hallmark of successful lawyering in
this country. For example, the Model Rules require a lawyer faced
with a potential conflict of interest between clients to either decline
representation or withdraw from the representation.62 However, “a
possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation.”63
58. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 273.
59. See infra Part III.B for a discussion regarding the relative weight judiciaries ought
to give to conflict of interest issues that exist in the tripartite relationship.
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1)–(2) (2001).
61. Id.
62. See id. R. 1.7 cmts.1–2.
63. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 4.
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Indeed, “[t]he critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will
eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the
lawyer’s independent professional judgment . . . .”64 If the lawyer is
paid by a source other than the client, as in the case of the lawyer
who is hired and paid by the insurance company, the Model Rules
allow representation only if the client gives informed consent to such
representation.65 Client consent is usually not difficult to obtain
because the client initially comes to the table seeking legal protection
against future liability. If the client refuses to consent, the client’s
only other option is to forgo liability insurance. Unfortunately, the
Model Rules offer little further assistance in defining the ethical
parameters of representation in the conflict-of-interest-ridden
tripartite relationships.66
The Model Rules do, however, highlight the importance of the
attorney-client relationship. The first critical question is whether the
lawyer has established an attorney-client relationship with the
insurer. If the insurer is not a client, the insurer will have more
difficulty establishing privity with the attorney. An attorney-client
relationship67 is created to “protect[] confidential communications
concerning legal advice between attorney and client.”68 Since the late
eighteenth century,69 legal scholars have assumed that “[j]ustice
could best be served if clients [were] encouraged to fully confide in

64. Id.
65. See id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
66. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 45 (2001)
(quoting ABA, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS O PINIONS 1983–1998, at 403 (2000))
(discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers hired by insurance companies).
67. See Michael Keeley, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrines: The
Boundaries of Protected Communications Between Insureds and Insurers, 33 TORT & INS. L.J.
1169 (1998). For further study, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), in
which the United States Supreme Court stated:
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law. . . . Its purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the
client.
(citations omitted).
68. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ , ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.06 (3d
ed. 2001).
69. Id. § 1.04.
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their legal advisers. Assured confidentiality through the privilege is
the source of that encouragement.”70
Opponents of attorney liability to the insurer use the attorneyclient privilege71 rationale to bolster their argument that because
inherent potential conflicts of interest exist in the tripartite
relationship (between the insured and the insurer), the insurance
defense counsel should not be helplessly juxtaposed between two
potential sources of liability without the ability to protect against it.72
Such advocates of protecting the sacredness of the attorney-client
relationship would vigorously oppose the Langerman decision
because, in general, Langerman allows a third party (insurer) to
distract the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client (insured).
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides
introductory guidance to insurance defense counsel, but fails to set
forth clear rules to determine whether and in what contexts
insurance defense counsel owes the insurer the same duty of care it
owes the insured. For example, section 14 of the Restatement
establishes:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a person
manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide
legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to
the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack
of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the
services . . . .73

The Langerman court determined that “either intent or
acquiescence may establish the relationship.”74 Comment c, however,
states that the intent may be manifest by explicit “facts” and
70. Id. § 1.06.
71. The efficacy of the attorney-client privilege is not debated in this Note. Relatively
little research has been performed to confirm whether the attorney-client privilege is effective
in eliciting client confidence and communication. Id. “Nonetheless, it is worth noting the few
empirical studies that have been undertaken. One focused on nonlawyer attitudes toward
professional confidences. It found that approximately 50% of those surveyed said that their
communications with counsel would be less candid without the privilege.” Id. In another
study, corporate executives indicated that “trust and confidence in a particular attorney” was
the most important factor in eliciting client communication other than the attorney-client
privilege. Id.
72. For a more thorough analysis of this argument, see Morgan, supra note 2.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14(1)(a)–(b) (1998).
74. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 596.
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“circumstances” such as a retainer agreement.75 Furthermore “[n]o
written contract is required in order to establish the relationship;”
however, “paying a lawyer does not by itself create a client-lawyer
relationship with the payor if the circumstances indicate that the
lawyer was to represent someone else.”76 Thus, in the context of the
tripartite relationship, where a general retainer agreement between
the attorney and the insured does not necessarily establish the insurer
as a client, the Restatement is ambiguous as to whether a relationship
exists between the attorney and the insurer. Yet it does state that,
“due consideration should be given to the unreasonableness of a
claimed expectation of entering into a co-client status when a
significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists between the
[co-clients].”77
Once a lawyer-client relationship is established, a lawyer has a
duty to “act in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s
lawful objectives,” to “avoid impermissible conflicting interests,” and
to “fulfil [sic] any valid contractual obligation to the client.”78 Under
the Restatement’s scheme, these duties79 are only present once an

75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. c.
76. Id.
77. Id. An attorney-client relationship may arise when the client “reasonably relies on
the lawyer to provide services, and the lawyer” reasonably knows or should know of the
reliance. Id. at cmt. e, illus. 2. In the context of the tripartite relationship, an insurer may have
reason to rely on the attorney to perform for the benefit of the insured, which often is for the
benefit of the insurer as well. However, if the retainer agreement does not establish that the
insurer is a client, the attorney may assume that she has a fiduciary relationship only to the
insured. The assumption of the attorney in this scenario would be in accordance with the
current majority rule in most jurisdictions. See infra Part III.C.2. Thus, the attorney may not
reasonably know of the insurer’s reliance and, therefore, should not be held to have a duty of
care to the insurer.
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28(1)–(4) (1992).
79. A draft of the Restatement explains the rationale behind a lawyer’s duty to a client:
[A] lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person’s affairs are
entrusted in circumstances that often make it difficult or undesirable for that other
person to supervise closely the performance of the fiduciary. Assurances of the
fiduciary’s loyalty and care are therefore vital, are provided by law, and would
presumably be provided by contract in any event by sophisticated persons in matters
warranting the burdens of negotiation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
5, 1992). Both lawyers and insurance companies are attuned to the legal risks placed upon
parties who assume liability. Both parties would probably be classified as “sophisticated
persons” in the phraseology of the Restatement and, therefore, should be required to enter
into a retainer agreement, detailing the intricacies of their relationship within the tripartite
triangle. Retainer agreements are often vague.
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attorney-client relationship is created.80 The Restatement seems very
hesitant to eliminate the rules that currently protect clients from
disloyal counsel. For example, section 28 advises that a lawyer cannot
act “beyond the scope” of the representation without client
permission and construes an attorney’s power broadly so as to avoid
any temptation for the lawyer to use his power to abuse the client.
Interestingly, the Restatement’s emphasis of the scope of the lawyer’s
representation suggests that the scope of representation is useful in
determining whether a relationship exists that would lead to a duty
of care between the attorney and the insurance company. The
Restatement instructs, “A lawyer must exercise care in pursuit of the
client’s lawful objectives in matters within the scope of the
representation. The lawyer is not liable for failing to act beyond that
scope.”81
Another way to characterize the issue in Langerman could be to
analyze whether representing the insurance company was within the
scope of the retainer agreement between Langerman and Paradigm.
If the representation was within the scope of the agreement, then
Langerman most likely had a duty of care to the insurance company;
thus, his liability to the company would be justified. If the retainer
agreement did not contemplate such an arrangement, then perhaps
Langerman was incorrectly burdened with liability. At any rate, since
“all jurisdictions permit clients to sue[,] . . . [i]t . . . makes sense to
ask whether a company and an insured can qualify as clients before
considering other theories that may entitle them to sue.”82
The Langerman court based part of its ruling on the fact that the
insurance company, as a third-party payor, was a non-client. The
Restatement suggests that a lawyer may owe a duty of care to a nonclient when the non-client relies on the fact that the lawyer offers
legal services to the client, that are intended to benefit the nonclient, and the lawyer knows of such reliance on the part of the nonclient.83 However, a lawyer’s duty to a non-client only exists when
“such a duty would not create inconsistent duties significantly

80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. a (1998).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. d (1997).
82. Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the
Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1592 (1994).
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(2)–(3)
(1994).
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impairing the lawyer’s performance.”84 The Langerman court argued
that the insurance company, as a non-client, had no recourse if
Langerman had no duty of care to the company.85 Although it would
be bad policy to allow an attorney’s negligence to injure a party that
reasonably relied upon the attorney’s representation, it seems unfair
to make the attorney liable to the insurer in cases where the retainer
agreement between the lawyer and the insurer does not clearly define
the lawyer’s duty. Without adequate procedural guidance governing
an insurance defense attorney’s relationship with the insurer, the
attorney could reasonably assume that his sole duty of care is to the
insured.
Finally, but no less important than the other Restatement
provisions detailing how an attorney-client relationship is formed,
Restatement section 134 indicates:
A lawyer’s professional conduct on behalf of a client may be
directed by someone other than the client if: (a) the direction does
not interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional
judgment; (b) the direction is reasonable in scope and character,
such as by reflecting obligations borne by the person directing the
lawyer; and (c) the client consents to the direction . . . .86

In the insurance defense context, insurance companies who hire
and pay for insurance defense counsel walk a fine line between
relinquishing too much control to the attorney, which often results
in excessive attorney fees and harmful settlements, and seizing too
much control from the attorney, which often impairs the attorney’s
ability to represent the primary client—the insured. Professor Silver
has suggested that “[w]hen thinking about the question ‘Who may
sue the lawyer?,’ it is important to keep firmly in mind that a person
who claims the right to sue thereby claims either the authority to
control how defense counsel acts or an entitlement to some sort of
consideration or performance from defense counsel.”87

84. Id. § 73(3).
85. See Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 599–600 (Ariz.
2001).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134(2)(a)–
(c)(1998). The comments in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
215 (1998) provide similar language as § 134. Therefore, this Note will not duplicate that
analysis.
87. Silver, supra note 82, at 1592.
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Although the Restatement does not comment on the relationship
between the insurer and the insured,88 this relationship is governed
by the policy contract agreed upon at the inception of coverage. The
downside of exclusive company control is that the company may
exercise so much control over the lawyer that the lawyer feels an
economic incentive to “lick the hand that feeds it.” Obviously, this is
a great risk to insureds who may feel the loyalty of their attorney
swayed by the payor of the attorney’s fees.89 The Restatement
contemplates this adverse effect and prohibits third-pary payors from
exercising exclusive control over the attorney’s activities if the
direction interferes with the attorney’s professional judgment.90
Ultimately, it is clear that the insurance defense attorney has an
attorney-client relationship with the insured. The insurer, however, is
not entitled to such a relationship “simply by the fact that it
designates the lawyer, a client of the lawyer.”91 Nevertheless, the
non-lawyer party may have a cause of action against the attorney for
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. f (1998).
89. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 24.
[I]t is easy to see that a lawyer representing the insurer and insured as separate and
equal co-clients faces a serious conflict of interest. . . . [T]he lawyer likely will never
see the insured again, whereas the insurance company is a prospective source of
many more legal fees. It is easy to imagine which ‘client’s’ interest the lawyer will
have an incentive to favor.
Id. Another author states:
[The attorney] stands as a fiduciary to the insured, a status that requires the strictest
observance of the insured’s best interests. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that
counsel may have a long-standing relationship with the insurer, and that assignments
from the insurer may generate a significant part of the attorney’s income. The
insured, however, is likely to be a “one-off” client whose relationship with the
attorney will last only for the life of the claim. Thus even the most punctilious of
lawyers, one with the highest ethics and the “best of motives,” might be perceived
by the courts as prone to favor the insurer over the insured. As the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has put it: “Even the most optimistic view of human nature
requires us to realize that an attorney employed by [or retained by] an insurance
company will slant his efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interest of his real
client—the one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future
business—the insurance company.
Dacey, supra note 42, at 204–05 (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser & Co.,
585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)); see also Michael Rigby, Note, The Broken Triangle—
Should Insurers Be Held Vicariously Liable for the Legal Malpractice of Counsel They Retain to
Defend Their Insureds?—State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d
625 (Tex. 1998), 41 S. TEX . L. REV. 651, 663 (2000) (citing the old proverb: “He who pays
the piper calls the tune”).
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134(2).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. f.

660

AND-FIN

643]

9/30/2002 10:37 AM

Attorney Liability in Insurance Defense Litigation

malpractice92 if either (1) a lawyer-client relationship is created
between the insurer and the attorney under Restatement section 14,
or (2) the attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client under
Restatement sections 5193 and 72.
The insured arguably benefits by allowing the company to have
exclusive control over the direction of the litigation and through the
symbiotic relationship that exists between the insurer and the insured
regarding their mutual need for defense counsel.94
Why would a company want the right to defend and demand
exclusive control of defense and settlement decisions? The reasons
usually given for the right—the need to defeat unwarranted claims,
the desire to minimize outlays on valid claims . . . and the need to
prevent collusion between claimants and insured—emphasize the
value the company derives from the right to defend. However, it is
important to see that the insured also benefits from the rule of
exclusive company control. The insured is protected by the
company’s financial resources, expertise, and efficiency in dealing
with claims, and by its risk-neutrality, bureaucratic structure,
reputation, bargaining skill, and ability to select and monitor
defense counsel, all of which enable the company to react to claims
better than the insured. [Arguably], [i]nsureds understand these
advantages and appreciate the value of the arrangement.95

It is debatable whether insureds truly appreciate this arrangement
as Professor Silver suggests. For the most part, insureds probably feel
that, because they are coughing up their hard-earned cash—usually a
large sacrifice—the insurer is obligated to provide quality liability

92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 cmt. f, indicates
that if these two conditions exist and if “the insurer is directly concerned in the matter
financially, the insurer should be accorded standing to assert a claim for appropriate relief from
the lawyer for financial loss proximately caused by professional negligence or other wrongful
act of the lawyer.”
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 states, in
pertinent part, the following:
A lawyer owes a duty to use care . . . to a nonclient when and to the extent that: (a)
the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the
representation that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient; (b) such a duty would
not significantly impair the lawyer’s performance of obligations to the client; and (c)
the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the
client unlikely. . . .
94. Silver, supra note 82, at 1595–96 (citations omitted).
95. Id.
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protection. Nevertheless, from an objective standpoint, mutual
benefits are conceivable.
Despite the mutual benefits of exclusive company control, under
the Restatement approach (the approach relied on in Langerman), if
an insurance company is a third-pary payor, the insurance company
gives up the right to claim liability for attorney malpractice when it
exercises exclusive control over the litigation. Arguably, when such
control is exercised and the professional judgment of the lawyer is
compromised, a conflict of interest is created between the insurer
and the insured, which conflict requires the attorney to give her
utmost loyalty to the insured at the expense of the insurer.
Furthermore, in cases of exclusive control, the company essentially
destroys its relationship status with the attorney, thereby eliminating
the attorney’s duty of care to the insurer.
The Restatement’s guidelines do not sufficiently answer
Langerman’s real question: How is insurance defense counsel
expected to know that it owes a duty of care to the insurance
company when the case is one of first impression for the court and
when the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Restatement
are equally ambiguous? Nevertheless, assuming that the attorneyclient relationships are clearly defined, the inherent conflicts of
interest between the insurer and the insured make joint
representation in the tripartite context unethical.96
B. Conflicts of Interest Between Insurer and Insured
As explained previously, disagreements do arise between insurers
and insured, which often result in conflicts of interest between
insurer and insured.97 Such conflicts of interest can be the source of
malpractice liability for insurance defense lawyers.98 The Restatement
prohibits a lawyer from representing a client where such

96. The ABA has argued that “[a]lthough defense lawyers must be sensitive to the
economic interests of the insurance companies . . . and cognizant of the fact that costs of
litigation ultimately are borne by insureds through premiums, they must not allow their
professional judgment or the quality of their legal service to be compromised materially by the
insurer.” ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 46 (2001).
97. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 266–67; see also Stephen L. Pepper, Applying
the Fundamentals of Lawyers’ Ethics To Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 29–
30 (1997–98).
98. See Rian D. Jorgensen, Lawyers’ Professional Liability: Overview and Current Issues,
563 PLI / LIT 89, 95–96 (1997).
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representation would involve a conflict of interest.99 “A conflict of
interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s
representation of the client would be materially and adversely
affected. . . .”100 The Restatement defines a “substantial risk” as a
“significant and plausible [risk], even if it is not certain or even
probable that [it] will occur. The standard requires more than a mere
possibility of adverse effect.”101 An “effect” is “material” if it affects
the obligations agreed to in the retainer agreement.102
Many potential conflicts of interest could emerge in the tripartite
relationship.103 For example, if the insurer knows it will not be
vicariously liable to the insured, it may attempt to undercut the pay
or the quantity of the attorney’s hours necessary to provide proper
representation.104 Conversely, “retained counsel . . . could
manipulate the trial strategy to benefit one client [over] the
other.”105 The defense attorney “may [also] become aware of
information damaging to a client through confidential
communication with the other client.”106 Such disagreements
between insured and insurer may arise for four reasons:
(1) the insured no longer bears the risk of paying the judgment or
settlement; (2) the insurer, and not the insured, bears the cost of
providing the defense; (3) the insurer has “an additional stake in
the outcome beyond the amount paid”; or (4) each party attempts
to take strategic advantage over the other to its ultimate benefit.107

99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (1998).
100. Id.
101. Id. cmt. c(iii).
102. Id. cmt. c(ii).
103. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Emerging Conflicts of Interest in Insurance Defense
Practice, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 69, 70 (1996) (examining the following emerging conflicts of
interest, all of which create dilemmas regarding the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the insurer:
“‘issue’ or ‘positional’ conflicts, the representation of former clients, insurer insolvency, ‘flat
fee’ or ‘fixed fee’ agreements between insurers and their regular counsel, and insurers’ use of
outside counsel guidelines to manage litigation”).
104. See Rigby, supra note 89, at 671.
105. Mizuo, supra note 2, at 681.
106. Id.
107. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 266–67. However, Professors Silver and Syverud
acknowledge, “Unfortunately, it is defense counsel who often must sort out these
disagreements between the company and the insured in particular lawsuits. Generally, the
disagreements arise after counsel has been retained by the insurance company (usually without
a formal written retainer agreement) to defend the case.” Id. at 267–68. They argue that if the
parties placed more emphasis on creating a retainer that specifically defined the scope of the
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Unfortunately, an end to such conflicts of interest is not in sight.
“Although a general framework of rules and guidelines has
developed over time to govern this [tripartite] relationship, there
remains a paucity of specific practical guidelines for the proper
handling of problems raised by conflicts of interest.”108 One author
expressed the frustration in the lack of judicial guidance as follows:
Even were there such a [foolproof] compass, new or emerging
conflicts pose difficult navigational problems. With limited
precedent to provide direction in most new areas [of conflicting
interests], defense counsel are left to rely largely on the Model
Rules and fact-specific decisions of varying worth in order to find
their professional way. Bon voyage.109

Such expressions of hopelessness are not encouraging to insurance
defense lawyers.
In dealing with emerging conflicts of interest, the judicial
majority agrees that the interests of the insured should be sustained
over the interests of the insurer, whereas the minority of courts
“generally accept[s] either the premise that counsel represents the
insured exclusively upon being retained . . . or that . . . counsel
primarily or exclusively serves the insured.”110 The next section
discusses the theories regarding how these potential conflicts of
interest should be mitigated.
C. Determining Who the Client Is—Insurer, Insured, or Both
With all the uncertainty regarding the procedural rules governing

relationship between the insurer and the attorney and if the courts respected the retainer
agreement and used it to identify liable parties, then the burden of deciphering legal
ambiguities would be taken off the shoulders of the insurance defense counsel and onto the
parties who form the initial agreements. Other conflicts of interest are also inherent in the
tripartite relationship:
Potential conflicts are by no means limited to issues involving the attorney-client
privilege. They can arise when the claimed damages exceed policy limits, thus
exposing the insured to personal liability; when counsel represents multiple insureds
whose own interests may diverge; when punitive damages, (uninsurable in several
jurisdictions and specifically excluded in may policies) are claimed; when the proofs
at trial could result in non-coverage, e.g. a finding that the insured was not acting
“within the scope of employment,” and many other areas . . . .
Dacey, supra note 42, at 207–08.
108. Gilbreath, supra note 43, at 144.
109. Richmond, supra note 103, at 86.
110. Mizuo, supra note 2, at 682–83.
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the tripartite relationship, it is not surprising that lawyers find such
circumstances unnerving. Scholars on this issue agree that
“[e]xperienced and thoughtful defense lawyers disagree on whether
the company is a client. Some claim to represent only the insured.
Some claim to represent the company for some purposes but not
others, or they regard the company as an employer but not as a
client.”111 But, rarely, because of frequent conflicts of interest, do
insurance defense attorneys default to the assumption that they
represent both the insurer and the insured in every instance. In a
recent ethics opinion, the ABA admitted that “[t]he question
whether the insurance company may be deemed a ‘client’ who can
direct the scope and extent of the representation is unsettled . . . .”112
However, several theories contribute to the jurisdictionally diverse
but vexing debate regarding tripartite relationships: the two-client
theory, the one-client theory, and the third-party-payor (or one-anda-half-client) theory.113
1. Two-client theory
The two-client theory is currently the majority view among
courts in the United States.114 It advocates that both the insurer and
the insured are clients of the insurance defense counsel. Thus, under
the two-client approach the attorney owes a duty of care to both the
insured and the insurer. The rationale behind this theory, as
promoted mostly by the insurance industry in this country, is that
both the insured and the insurer are beneficiaries of the company’s
111. Silver, supra note 82, at 1603.
112. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 46 (2001).
113. Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 98. The Langerman court seemed to use a
combination of the third-party-payor approach and the two-client approach. It discussed both
the reliance issue and the fact that the insurer was economically concerned, being the party to
foot the costs of representation and settlement. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law
Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 599–601 (Ariz. 2001). It also briefly acknowledges the existence of
company control in the fiscal management of the litigation. Id. at 596.
114. See Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 98; Mizuo, supra note 2, at 680; Silver & Syverud,
supra note 1, at 273. The following cases, although not an exhaustive list, recognized the twoclient model: Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir.
1995); Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 198 (Ala. 1988); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gladstone,
93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145,
1152 (Haw. 1998); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 329
(Ill. 1991); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 160–61 (Ind. 1999); Moeller v. Am.
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1070 (Miss. 1996); Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172,
1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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exclusive control over the litigation.115 Further, the consent
requirement makes managing the litigation more difficult.116 “The
[insurance] industry argues that in the majority of cases that settle
quickly and within policy limits, the insured does not need to know
whether counsel was appointed, much less to consent to that
appointment.”117 Although the Langerman court recognized the
existence of potential conflicts of interest inherent in the tripartite
relationship, it discounted the mere existence of a potential conflict
where no actual conflict existed; thus, it found that the attorney was
liable to the insurer118—a result that would similarly be reached
under the two-client analysis.
Apart from the tripartite context, the general law regarding joint
clients is relatively clear on its face: “Clients may jointly retain (or
one client may retain for the joint benefit of others) the services of
an attorney as their common agent on a legal matter of common
interest, and the attorney-client privilege will protect their
confidential communications with that attorney.”119 Advocates of the
two-client view discount the notion that conflicts of interest
dominate the insurer/insured relationship and bolster the idea that
“companies and insureds usually enjoy a substantial commonality of
interests, even when their interests do not perfectly align.”120 Again,
by holding that the attorney had a duty to the insurer only when
conflicts of interest arose between insurer and insured, the
Langerman court implicitly agreed with the notion that the interests
of insured and insurers are usually in harmony with each other.
2. One-client theory
Although the two-client view is currently the majority rule, the
judicial trend leads to “increasing the supremacy of the attorney’s
obligation to the insured.”121 The rationale behind this movement

115. See supra Part III.A.
116. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 17.
117. Id.
118. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 597.
119. PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 8:16 (2d
ed. 1999).
120. Silver, supra note 82, at 1609.
121. Dacey, supra note 42, at 205; see also Jill B. Berkeley, Confidential Communications
Among the Insured, the Insurer, and Defense Counsel, 26–SPG BRIEF 22, 26 (1997)
(supporting the notion that a lawyer’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the insured endorses the one-
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seems to be a greater emphasis on the integrity of the lawyer’s service
to one client—the insured:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of the client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither the lawyer’s
personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of
third persons should be permitted to dilute the lawyer’s loyalty to
the client.122

The Michigan Supreme Court advanced the one-client view in
Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Bell,123 where the plurality
found that an insurance company had not established an attorneyclient relationship with the insurance defense counsel “even though
the company hired the lawyer, paid the lawyer’s fee, and bore the
brunt of the lawyer’s misconduct.”124
The Bell court chose the one-client theory based on the doctrine
of equitable subrogation.125 Finding a happy medium in the
application of this theory, the Bell court thought it too harsh to allow
the insurer an attorney-client relationship with defense counsel
because allowing such a relationship would dilute the attorney’s
loyalty to the primary client—the insured.126 However, the Bell court
also felt uneasy about barring the insurance company from any source
of recourse for damages sustained.127 Rather than choosing one of
these two extremes, the court, basing its holding on the theory of
equitable subrogation, allowed the insurer to sue for malpractice only
in circumstances where the insured was injured by the attorney’s
negligence.128 By embracing the inviolability of an attorney’s absolute
loyalty to her client, the Bell court strengthened the validity of the
one-client theory. The language of the Restatement129 regarding the
client school of thought); Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 98 (mentioning that although the oneclient view is gaining favor in the courts, the conflict of interest issues that vex the tripartite
relationship will exist regardless of the particular view espoused); Silver & Syverud, supra note
1, at 273 (claiming that the one-client view is gaining popularity).
122. Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 95.
123. 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991) (plurality opinion).
124. Silver, supra note 82, at 1584 (citing Bell, 475 N.W.2d at 297).
125. Bell, 475 N.W.2d at 298 (defining equitable subrogation as “the substitution of one
person in the place of another with reference to the lawful claim or right”).
126. Id. at 298–99.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers was issued
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number of an attorney’s clients illustrates the American Law Institute’s
current favoritism of the one-client view.130
3. Third-party payor or one-and-a-half-client theory
The third-party-payor theory advocates that “the lawyer be
deemed to represent both the insurer and the insured until
something goes wrong, at which time the insurer would no longer
be a client, at least in the usual sense.”131 The Langerman court also
based its decision upon the third-party-payor theory, a theory
premised on the assumption that, although undivided loyalty is
required to the insured, the company is in the best position to
manage and control the litigation and often relies on the attorney to
protect its economic interests. If such litigation management can be
done without compromising the loyalty an attorney owes to the
insured, then the attorney can and should owe the insurer a duty of
care.132 Under the third-pary-payor theory, the insurer, although not
necessarily considered as having established an express attorney-client
relationship with the attorney, relies upon the attorney’s
representation to the insured. The insurer is thus permitted to sue
the attorney who acts negligently.133
Consistent with the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the
predominant underlying premise of the third-party-payor approach is
the concept of economic reliance on the part of the insurer. Because
most insurance policy agreements give insurance companies the right
to control the management of litigation, insurance companies have
tremendous incentive to minimize costs. And indeed, some argue
that the insurer’s direct financial concerns should justify its ability to

several months before the Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell. See Silver, supra,
note 82, at 1588. Moreover, the proposed language in the Restatement “may turn out to be
the most influential endorsement of the one-client view.” Id. at 1589.
130. See id. at 1588–89. Certain headings in the Restatement, “Lawyer’s Obligation to
Third Persons” and “Fee Payment by a Third Person,” “leave little doubt as to the ALI’s
estimate of the number of clients defense counsel represents.” Id. at 1588.
131. Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special
Solutions Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 276 (1997–98) (advocating the one-and-a-halfclient view).
132. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 46 (2001).
133. The Restatement states that in some instances, “the lawyer’s duty arises from the
principle of promissory estoppel, under which promises inducing reasonable reliance may be
enforced to avoid injustice.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14
illus. 2 (1998).

668

AND-FIN

643]

9/30/2002 10:37 AM

Attorney Liability in Insurance Defense Litigation

sue the insurance defense lawyer for malpractice.134 As the
Langerman court indicated, insurance defense negligence can have
an enormous economic impact on the insurance company while it
may have little or no effect on the insured.135 Although insurance
companies may believe this theory would allow them to sue for
malpractice while still maintaining exclusive control over the
litigation, the Restatement “imposes limitations on the control that a
third person may exercise over the lawyer’s work.”136 The
consequence of these limitations are that, under the third-partypayor view, insurance companies will not be able to enjoy the full
range of benefits and rights of control they desire.
IV. SOLUTION—LOOK TO THE RETAINER AGREEMENT
The tripartite relationship makes all players in an insurance
defense suit—insured, insurer, and insurance defense attorney alike—
vulnerable to uncertainty and possible injury. To mitigate potential
damage to the insurance company, most insurance policies provide
for some degree of company control over potential claims against the
insured. Nevertheless, even after companies have taken proactive
steps to protect themselves, insurance companies still find themselves
vulnerable to economic injury.
Although some courts, like Bell, apply the doctrine of equitable
subrogation and allow the company to become an injured party only
when the insured has been injured by the attorney’s negligence, questions
still arise when the insured is not injured by attorney negligence. The
Langerman court held that the attorney is liable because the insurer is, as
a third-party payor, in a position of economic reliance and will be offered
no other avenues of redress.137 Although the Langerman holding may
have been an equitable result for the insurer in this particular case, it still
generally leaves the insurance defense attorney in the dark regarding the
attorney’s question of “to whom do I owe a duty of care?.” It seems clear
that the uniqueness of the tripartite relationship, currently governed
under the laws of professional responsibility, provides no adequate
solution to protect all parties simultaneously.

134.
135.
2001).
136.
137.

See Quinn, supra note 53, at 182.
See Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 599–600 (Ariz.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 cmt. a.
Langerman, 24 P.3d at 600.
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Because neither the one-client, two-client, or third-party-payor
views are inherently flawed per se, the parties ought to be able to
create whatever type of arrangement they desire.138 However, in
order to fill the ambiguous gaps within the tripartite relationship,
courts should adopt a rule allowing the retainer agreement, formed
between the insurer and the attorney, to become the operative
document in judicial interpretation of the tripartite relationship.139
The retainer agreement is usually created without a formal written
document.140 This proposed “retainer rule” would not require a
complete overhaul of the insurance defense system as it exists today,
but it would encourage insurers and attorneys to form express
retainer agreements that actually explain the intended relationship.
As stated earlier in this Note, there are benefits to the insurance
company controlling the scope of liability claims against the
insured.141 Whereas the policy agreement or “liability contract”
dictates the scope of the insurers’ indemnification of insured’s
liability,142 the retainer agreement defines the scope of the
relationship between the insurer and the attorney.143 In emphasizing
the perilousness of absolute adherence to either the one-client or
two-client approaches, Professors Silver and Syverud contend:
[D]efense counsel has as many clients as the participants decide
counsel should represent. Defense counsel has one client if and
when the retainer agreement provides that counsel shall represent
only the insured; defense counsel has two clients if and when the
retainer agreement requires counsel to represent the company as
well. Because attorney-client relationships arise consensually,

138. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 274.
139. Of course, such a rule would require the retainer agreement to be an express
agreement. Currently the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14
only requires a manifestation of consent. Although it is contrary to the rule this Note proposes,
the Langerman court held that an attorney-client relationship did not require an express
agreement. 24 P.3d at 595.
140. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 267–68.
141. See Silver, supra note 82, at 1592, 1595–96. The company benefits from its right
and its duty to defend the insured. “[I]t is important to keep firmly in mind that a person who
claims the right to sue thereby claims either the authority to control how defense counsel acts
or an entitlement to some sort of consideration or performance from defense counsel.” Id. at
1592.
142. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 269.
143. See id. at 270.
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whether defense counsel has one client or two depends upon the
agreement that counsel enters into when retained.144

The retainer theory is premised on the notion that both the
insurer-attorney relationship and the attorney-client relationship are
consensual in nature. Both the attorney-client relationship and the law
of agency rely upon the formation of agreements.145 Thus, locking the
parties into one arrangement theory when they may want to form
another is unreasonable. Because only a party who has established an
attorney-client relationship can sue the attorney for malpractice,
allowing the insurer and the attorney to establish the privity
relationship formally in the retainer agreement gives both parties the
right to sue. “[T]he retainer agreement determines whether the
attorney represents the company and for what purposes. The retainer
may require the attorney to represent the company and the insured,
the company alone, or only the insured. Or, it may create a hybrid of
these alternatives.”146 Because the duties of the insurance defense
attorney are capable of being consensually altered by agreement, “the
retainer agreement is of overwhelming importance in deciding what
defense counsel’s responsibilities are to be.”147 Finally, although the
retainer agreement is useful to the insurer and insured, it also provides
insurance defense attorneys with a direct source from which to
determine the scope of their duties to the insurer.148 Once the insurer
and the insurance defense attorney create a retainer agreement,
“judges should respect their decision.”149 Clearly, all parties involved
in the tripartite relationship, including judges who are forced to
interpret the scope of the unique relationships within this insurance
triangle, would benefit by the retainer rule.
A common criticism of the retainer rule is that “the tripartite
relationship is really no different from any other multi-client
representation in which the clients agree to allocate among
themselves the responsibilities of managing the litigation and
decision making.”150 Even though these critics acknowledge that an
144. See id. at 274.
145. See id. at 275.
146. Silver, supra note 82, at 1604.
147. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 270–71.
148. See id. at 272–73.
149. Id. at 279.
150. Katherine E. Giddings & J. Stephen Zielezienski, Insurance Defense in the TwentyFirst Century: The Florida Bar’s Proposed Statement of Insured Client’s Rights—A Unique
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attorney in such a multi-client relationship must “be cognizant of the
potential for ethical risks,”151 they fail to appreciate the extent of the
ethical risks uniquely inherent in the tripartite relationship.152 As
discussed previously in this Note,153 it cannot be assumed that the
insurer will always allow the insurance defense attorney to act in the
insured’s best interest.
Professor Stephen Pepper alleges that another weakness of the
retainer agreement theory is that, because “there are obvious
potential conflicts of interest between the [insurer and the insured]
at the inception of the relationship,” it may be difficult, if not
impossible to obtain the informed consent from both parties,
especially the insured.154 However, juxtaposing the three alternative
relationships between the insurer and the attorney (the one-client,
two-client, or third-party-payor models) and the potential responses
the insured may have to each of these relationships shows that
informed consent should not be difficult to obtain from the insured.
The three different relationships can be analogized to different
products offered on the insurance market to customers desiring
various levels of protection.155 When the retainer agreement expressly
adopts the one-client model, the insured is provided with the highest
level of liability protection. The insured knows and has complete
confidence that the attorney’s duty is solely to protect its (the
insured’s) interests. In the event that the retainer agreement expressly
adopts the two-client model, the insured is aware that, although the
attorney is representing its interest in the litigation, it also has a duty
to the insurer who is financially responsible for providing the liability
coverage for the insured. If the retainer agreement expressly adopts
the third-party-payor model, the insured knows that, although the
attorney’s sole duty is to represent its interests, the attorney may also
be liable to the insurer if the insurer detrimentally relies on the
attorney’s representations and is economically damaged as a result. An
informed insured will understand that even in the third-party-payor

Approach to the Tripartite Relationship, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 856 (2001).
151. Id. at 858, 861.
152. Giddings and Zielezienski incorrectly suggest that “settled law” has already resolved
the legal dilemmas regarding the tripartite relationship in the insurance defense context. See id.
at 856–60.
153. See supra Part III.B.
154. Pepper, supra note 97, at 29.
155. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 262–63.
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model, the attorney will feel pressure to adhere to the directions of the
insurer, but perhaps not to the same degree as it would under the
two-client model.
Currently, the procedural standards established by the courts,
including the Langerman court, seek to impose upon customers of
liability insurance one of these three models as the governing regime
in all circumstances. Under the retainer agreement standard,
however, insurance liability customers are free to “shop the market”
for their desired level of liability protection. Indeed, as is the case “in
all other contexts,” including the health insurance context, insurance
customers can chose between a plethora of levels of liability
protection.156 The greater the protection, the more the product will
cost to the consumer. Nevertheless, consumers (insureds) have the
final choice regarding the level of liability protection they purchase;
insureds will most likely give their informed consent to the insurance
policy (with the corresponding duties) they purchase. Under the
retainer agreement standard, all parties in the tripartite relationship
will clearly know and understand their respective rights and duties.
Ultimately, informed consent should not be a formidable barrier to
implementation of the retainer rule.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s
decision in Langerman would have been altered had the court
examined the retainer agreement between Paradigm and the
Langerman Law Offices. Because of the procedural posture of
Langerman,157 the Arizona Supreme Court viewed the facts in the
light most favorable to Paradigm and assumed that malpractice by
Langerman actually occurred and that such malpractice had injured
Paradigm.158 Thus, by failing to even mention the existence of a
retainer agreement between Langerman and Paradigm, the facts are
insufficient to determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s
decision would have been any different from its outcome had the
retainer agreement been relied upon. However, although the retainer

156. Id.
157. The trial court judge that heard Langerman granted summary judgment in favor of
Langerman. 24 P.3d 593, 600 (Ariz. 2001). Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court, hearing
the case on appeal, took the facts in the light most favorable to Paradigm. See id. at 594.
158. Id.
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rule may not have changed the eventual outcome, the court’s use of
the retainer rule in its analysis would have established concrete
procedural standards for future cases. Essentially, the three main
issues examined by the Langerman court—(1) whether an express
agreement is necessary to form an attorney-client relationship, (2)
whether there are potential conflicts of interest if the insurer is a
second client, and (3) whether the lawyer has a duty to a nonclient—would have been non-issues because the retainer agreement
would most likely have resolved each issue.
Laws of professional responsibility govern conduct between lawyer
and client,159 which, depending on the scope of the retainer
agreement, can be the insured, the insurer, or both. The retainer rule
requires that contract law, in addition to the rules of professional
responsibility, influence the resolution of conflicts that frequently arise
in the tripartite relationship. Neither the laws of professional
responsibility nor the laws of contracts should operate
independently;160 rather, in this unique tripartite realm of insurance
defense litigation, both are needed to offer all parties, including the oft
unaided defense attorney, proper procedural guidance. Such guidance,
for the lawyer, is critical to avoiding malpractice liability and
maintaining high ethical standards of representation. With the issue in
Langerman being one of first impression in Arizona, the court failed
to clarify the procedural standards governing whether an attorney is
liable to an insurer for negligence. The Langerman court, on a factspecific basis, determined that the attorney was liable, but it failed to
give adequate direction for insurance defense lawyers who seek to
avoid such pitfalls in the future.
Without procedural clarification, insurance defense lawyers will
continue to traverse the obscurity of the tripartite relationship—
directionless. Utilizing the retainer agreement to define the duties of
insurance defense counsel will minimize unwarranted risk in the
unnecessarily risky business of lawyering in the tripartite relationship.
Nathan Andersen

159. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421 at 45 (2001).
160. See Silver, supra note 82, at 1627 (“It is important . . . to be open to the suggestion
that occasionally the law of professional responsibility should give way.”).
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